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The high oil prices and the sharp increases in royalties mean that the natural 
gas boom in Bolivia has become very important for the economy. This paper 
uses a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model to assess the impacts 
of this boom on key macroeconomic variables as well as the distribution of 
incomes in the society. From a macroeconomic perspective, the natural gas 
boom is a blessing, adding around 1 percentage point to GDP growth rates 
for at least a decade, and sharply increasing government revenues available 
for public spending and investment. However, the poorest segments of the 
population (rural small-holders and urban informals) suffer actual reductions 
in their real incomes, compared to the counterfactual scenario without the 
gas boom. This means that the natural gas boom not only causes an increase 
in inequality but also an increase in poverty. The paper finishes with some 
policy recommendations on how to counteract the negative side effects of 
the natural gas boom.  
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The hydrocarbon sector in Bolivia has undergone dramatic changes in the last few years. 
After capitalization of the state oil company in 1996 and the application of the “Ley de 
Hidrocarburos” (No. 1689), certified natural gas and oil reserves sky-rocketed due to 
increased exploration efforts. Bolivia signed a contract with Brazil to deliver 7.1 trillion 
cubic feet (TCF) of natural gas over 20 years, and after the completion of the pipeline in 
1999, both natural gas and oil exports have increased dramatically, now accounting for 
almost half of the country’s exports, as compared to only 7% in 1999.  
 
Andersen & Faris (2002) used a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model to simulate 
some of the changes that were likely to occur in the Bolivian economy due to the increased 
natural gas exports, focusing particularly on the changes in income distribution that were 
likely to arise from these economic changes. The model indicated a temporary, 3-year 
increase in GDP growth rates of approximately 2% per year and then a reversion to the 
previous level of growth. It also indicated a dramatic increase in government revenues, due 
to taxes and royalties received from the hydrocarbon sector, and an increase in inequality, 
as the government tends to spend most of its revenues on skilled workers, such as teachers, 
doctors, bureaucrats and consultants, while the much poorer rural small-holders are largely 
unaffected.   3
 
However, since that study there has been several unexpected developments in the sector. 
First, the price of oil did not stay at the expected level of approximately $20 per barrel, but 
rather jumped to more than $60 per barrel. Since the price of natural gas in the contract was 
linked to a basket of international oil prices, both exports and government revenues have 
received an enormous and unexpected boost. Second, due to the high level of prices, the 
hydrocarbon sector became extremely profitable, and the Bolivian government decided to 
increase royalties from the 18% agreed during capitalization to the 50% that the population 
violently demanded (Law No. 3058, May 2005). A few months later, the government added 
another tax increasing total government take to 82% for the two biggest natural gas fields. 
Finally, by May 1
st, 2006, the government nationalized the hydrocarbon sector for the third 
time in the last 70 years.   
  
Given that government revenues and exports from the hydrocarbon sector have proved to 
be many times higher than expected in 2002, this paper provides an update of the analysis 
provided in Andersen & Faris (2002). 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a short history of the 
hydrocarbon sector in Bolivia since the first discovery of oil about a century ago till the 
recent nationalization in May 2006. Section 3 shows how prices, export volumes, and 
government revenues have evolved during the last few decades, and projects how they will 
evolve in the future. These are three key inputs into the CGE model, the structure of which 
will be explained in Section 4. Section 5 applies the model to analyze the major structural   4
effects of an increase in Natural Gas exports. Section 6 uses the model to analyze how these 
structural changes will affect the distribution of income among different types of 
households. Finally, Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. A short history of the Bolivian oil and gas sector
1 
 
Petroleum reserves were first found in Bolivia in 1896 by Manuel Cuellar, who organized 
the Sindicato Sucre for its extraction and commercialization. The Sindicato managed to 
obtain concessions totaling 74.400 hectares in 1911, but had trouble raising funds to drill 
wells and construct a refinery. Bolivian capitalists refused to participate, and negotiations 
with interested European firms were delayed by the First World War. Chilean interests, 
however, amassed huge petroleum concessions in Bolivia until the government of Bautista 
Saavedra in June of 1921 passed the “Ley Orgánica de Petróleo” limiting the size of 
concessions to a maximum of 100.000 hectares and setting a royalty rate of 11%.  
 
Despite that law, Standard Oil managed to buy up more than 7 million hectares of 
petroleum concessions in Bolivia, and created productive wells in Bermejo (1924), 
Sanandita (1926), Camiri (1927) and Camatindi (1931).  
 
The discovery of petroleum in the southern part of Bolivia provoked a war (the Chaco War 
of 1932-35) with neighboring Paraguay over access to these resources. More than 250.000 
                                                 
1 This section is based on YPFB (1996).   5
Bolivians were sent to defend this inhospitable and uninhabited region, and more than 
50.000 young Bolivians died, if not from bullets, then from thirst and diseases. The war 
was an economic disaster for both of the poor countries. Bolivia lost territory to Paraguay, 
but so far no oil has been found in the lost territory. 
 
Once the war was over, Bolivian Standard Oil was accused of having smuggled oil to 
Argentina, evading the 11% royalties, and of not having paid the annual patents for its 
concessions in a time of urgent national need. Standard Oil declared itself “neutral” in the 
war, and refused to supply gasoline to Bolivian war planes. As a consequence of such 
unpatriotic behavior, the company was nationalized in March of 1937, and the state oil 
company, Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB) was created. 
 
For several years, YPFB was struggling due to lack of capital and experienced personnel. 
To overcome the latter constraint, YPFB hired many foreign (mainly Argentinean) experts 
but also gave scholarships to Bolivian students to go abroad to study petroleum 
engineering, geology and chemistry.  
 
The company invested heavily in exploration activities during the 1940s and by the early 
1950s production finally took off. In 1954, Bolivia achieved self-suffiency for the first time 
in history and changed status from petroleum importer to petroleum exporter. 
 
Having found significant oil reserves, the country realized that it did not have the capital to 
rationally exploit these reserves, so in October of 1955 it passed a new law, “El Código del   6
Petróleo” which opened up for foreign direct investment. Apart from the royalties of 11% 
that already existed, this law added a tax of 19% on gross production. 
 
Fourteen oil companies, of which Bolivian Gulf Oil was the most important, entered the 
country in the following years. After a period of stagnation, petroleum production five-
doubled from about 3 million barrels per year during the early 60s to 15 million barrels in 
1968 (see Figure 1 below). 
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Source: Authors’ elaboration based on information from YPFB. 
   7
With the oil sector looking so lucrative again, the government decided to nationalize 
Bolivian Gulf Oil in October 1969. The company was awarded a little over $100 million in 
compensation, to be paid in oil from the nationalized oil fields.  
 
The nationalization produced a temporary setback, as the World Bank suspended financing, 
and operational information disappeared together with Bolivian Gulf. However, already in 
1972, production reached a new record of 17 million barrels. 
 
More investment was urgently needed in order to take advantage of the extremely high oil 
prices in the early 1970s, so the government passed a new law “Ley General de 
Hidrocarburos” in 1972 which allowed for production sharing agreements between YPFB 
and foreign companies. Royalties were raised to 12%, the additional tax was kept at 19%, 
but another 19% of gross production should be paid to YPFB, which meant that the total 
government take was now 50%. 
 
During the 1970s, 13 foreign companies signed contracts with YPFB and invested about 
$220 million dollars in the sector. Importantly, a contract was signed with Argentina to 
deliver natural gas by pipeline over a 20 year period starting in 1972. This marked the 
beginning of Bolivia’s Natural Gas boom (see Figure 2). 
   8
Figure 2: Natural Gas production in Bolivia, 1953 - 2005 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on information from YPFB. 
 
While natural gas production kept a steady pace over the next two decades in order to 
satisfy the contract with Argentina, oil production plummeted in the second half of the 70s 
in response to the falling oil prices. Both because it became non-profitable with the low 
prices and high taxes, but also because the country went into a general crisis during the first 
half of the 1980s. 
 
Production started recovering again, together with the country, after the implementation of 
the Supreme Decree 21060 which put and end to hyperinflation and economic crisis with 
the introduction of stabilization policies and the opening up of the economy. As part of the 
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companies took over the management of the sector, while Bolivians kept an important share 
in the form of pension funds. 
 
According to the “Ley de Hidrocarburos,” royalties varied between 50% for already 
producing fields to 18% for new fields. In addition, there were various taxes on profits, but 
due to the large amounts of investments in the sector during the late 1990s, companies 
reported little profits and thus paid very little in taxes.  
 
As companies managed to shift production from old to new fields, total government take 
dropped from around 50% just after the law was passed to an average around 30% six years 
later. In 1996, soon after the Ley de Hidrocarburos was passed, a natural gas export 
contract was signed with Brazil, promising the delivery of 7.1 trillion cubic feet of gas over 
a 20 year period. A several billion dollar pipeline was constructed to bring the gas to Sao 
Paolo and once completed, natural gas exports started increasing dramatically. Prices also 
soared, which meant that the oil and gas sector once again became extremely lucrative, and 
the Bolivian government decided it wanted a bigger part of the cake. It first raised royalties 
to 50% in 2005, and then in May 2006 it nationalized the sector for the 3
rd time in 70 years.  
 
3. The evolution of key variables 
Reserves and production 
This section presents more detailed information about natural gas and oil production in the 
period 1998-2005. Production is presented by company field operator. For example, the   10
production of the San Alberto field is shared between three companies in the following 
proportions: 50% for Andina, 35% for Petrobras and 15% for Total E&F. Nevertheless, 
Petrobras is the company field operator, which means that these numbers have to be 
understood at field level, not from a company point of view. 
 
Table 1 presents the natural gas production subject to the payment of royalties and taxes for 
the period 1998-2005. The important participation of the two large fields (San Alberto and 
Sábalo) is clearly observed. In fact, a large part of the recent natural gas production growth 
is due to the production from these two fields, operated by Petrobras. 
Table 1: Natural gas production (Million cubic feet per day) 
Operator 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Andina 100        80          108        126        164        135        179        168       
Río Grande 24          20          59          78          75          49          82          71         
Sirari 19          17          22          23          24          13          17          20         
Víbora 39          28          25          24          34          34          38          43         
Others 18          16          2            1            30          39          42          34         
Chaco 79          73          77          108        103        104        116        114       
Bulo Bulo -         -         14          54          69          58          33          52         
Carrasco 45          39          33          11          11          15          18          19         
San Roque 23          18          13          9            7            6            5            5           
Vuelta Grande 11          17          17          34          13          15          28          24         
Kanata -         -         -         -         3            10          28          14         
Others -         -         -         -         0            0            5            0           
Vintage 28          22          38          35          26          25          32          18         
Repsol YPF -         0            27          24          11          8            12          81         
Margarita -         -         -         -         -         -         0            65         
Others -         0            27          24          11          8            12          16         
Petrobras Energia 25          18          28          37          35          36          35          34         
Petrobras -         -         -         96          153        333        526        677       
San Alberto -         -         -         96          153        200        173        304       
Sábalo -         -         -         -         -         132        352        373       
Pluspetrol 6            5            3            5            10          9            1            24         
Tacobo -         -         -         -         -         -         -         23         
Others 6            5            3            5            10          9            1            1           
Dong Won 0            -         -         -         -         -         0            -        
BG 35          23          32          42          79          39          56          60         
TOTAL (MM cubic feet/day) 273        222        312        473        582        688        957        1,177    
TOTAL (MM cubic meters/day) 8            6            9            13          16          19          27          33         
TOTAL(1) (MM cubic meters/day) 8            6            9            11          12          10          12          12         
Source: Authors' elaboration based on information from YPFB.
(1) Total without the large gas fields (San Alberto, Sábalo and Margarita).    11
 
Two facts explain the importance of these two fields in total production. The first is the 
production assignment of these two fields within the Gas Sales Agreement (GSA) with 
Brazil. According to clause 21.2 of the contract, the fields San Alberto and Sábalo have, 
respectively, 40.2% and 32.2% of the 30.08 MM cubic meters per day of natural gas agreed 
in the GSA
2. The second fact is the large reserves in those fields.  
 
Table 2 shows that San Alberto and Sábalo (both located in the department of Tarija) 
together have 46% of total natural gas reserves, as of January 2005. 
 
Table 2: Natural Gas Reserves (TCF) 




San Alberto 11.7                 24%
Sábalo 10.7                 22%
Margarita 10.5                 22%
Itau 7.8                   16%
Others 8.1                   17%
Total 48.8                 100%
Source: Author’s elaboration based on information from YPFB.  
 
Another fact that stands out in Table 2 is the other two large fields, Margarita and Itaú, 
which together have 37% of the total reserves. Production from these fields is still limited 
due to the lack of markets. Indeed, if markets in Mexico or USA had been negotiated, these 
fields would have been the most important suppliers.   
 
                                                 
2 One cubic meter corresponds to 35.3146 cubic feet.    12
Table 3 presents numbers for oil production, which is closely related to natural gas 
production, as the two are typically found together, although in varying proportions. As in 
the case of natural gas, San Alberto and Sábalo are the two most important fields in Bolivia. 
They produce almost 36% of the liquids and great part of the growth of production is due to 
the production of these two fields. The reserves of these two fields (Table 4) and the 
production of natural gas from these fields, allows such large participation in total 
production. However, a fact that is also worth mentioning is the quantity of exclusive oil 
fields with small production and reserves. These play an important function since they 
produce the petroleum that is used to produce diesel oil, which is in short supply in Bolivia. 
Although there is a large production of liquids, it is not enough to satisfy the domestic 
demand for diesel oil. In general the fossil fuels in Bolivia are relatively light, supplying 
large amounts of clean natural gas but little of the heavy, and more polluting, chemical 
structures needed to produce diesel oil.    13
Table 3: Oil Production (Barrels per day) 
Operator 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Andina 10,483      8,874        9,048        8,563        8,539        7,744       6,963       5,583      
Río Grande 1,109        1,387        1,806        2,520        2,703        2,206       2,150       1,817      
Sirari 1,677        1,463        1,531        1,142        922           701          612          458         
Víbora 4,355        3,537        3,390        3,074        2,561        2,126       1,865       1,534      
La Peña 765           839           1,289        1,006        1,084        1,335       880          484         
Tundy 1,772        971           159           0               0               -           -           -          
Others 805           677           873           821           1,269        1,376       1,456       1,290      
Chaco 11,402      8,659        7,473        9,189        9,963        8,856       9,454       7,824      
Bulo Bulo -           -           640           2,572        3,551        3,383       3,128       2,966      
Carrasco 4,097        2,922        2,055        633           422           347          236          192         
Los Cusis 2,363        1,340        1,153        1,020        799           611          538          449         
Kanata -           -           -           -           475           1,169       2,342       1,777      
Vuelta Grande 2,219        1,928        1,827        1,646        1,532        1,343       1,243       1,252      
Patujusal 1,959        1,910        1,336        2,499        2,485        1,559       1,027       730         
Patujusual Oeste -           -           -           562           488           276          142          115         
Others 764           559           462           257           211           168          798          343         
Vintage 673           434           676           597           465           386          446          220         
Repsol YPF 13,239      12,934      11,998      12,435      10,040      10,042     9,874       13,731    
Monteagudo 626           1,031        830           762           657           500          402          315         
Paloma 7,425        7,779        6,066        6,142        5,309        4,812       3,380       2,767      
Surubí 4,508        3,547        3,929        4,266        2,409        2,587       1,977       1,922      
Surubí Noroeste -           -           -           -           -           607          3,071       2,879      
Surubí BB 626           525           623           1,113        1,596        1,459       920          1,755      
Margarita -           -           501           110           -           6              67            4,046      
Others 54             52             49             42             69             71            57            47           
Petrobras Energía 515           514           940           1,170        1,024        1,033       1,066       966         
Petrobras -           -           6               2,298        3,726        9,842       16,699     20,342    
San Alberto -           -           6               2,298        3,693        4,932       4,442       7,443      
Sábalo -           -           -           -           33             4,910       12,257     12,899    
Pluspetrol 285           280           217           174           234           304          179          311         
Tacobo -           -           -           -           -           -           -           136         
Others 285           280           217           174           234           304          179          175         
Dong Won 17             11             1               2               -           33            7              -          
BG Bolivia 1,128        680           1,072        1,220        2,146        1,193       1,658       1,680      
Escondido 739           270           671           671           1,168        822          1,121       1,049      
La Vertiente 360           191           361           291           312           279          272          343         
Others 29             219           40             258           666           92            265          288         
Canadian 52             74             142           124           99             25            -           -          
Matpetrol -           -           -           24             46             87            100          99           
Itau -           -           -           -           6               -           -           -          
TOTAL 37,798      32,460      31,573      35,796      36,288      39,545     46,446     50,756    
TOTAL (1) 37,798      32,460      31,066      33,388      32,562      29,697     29,680     26,368    
Source: Authors' elaboration based on information from YPFB.
(1) Total without the large gas fields (San Alberto, Sábalo, Margarita).  
   14
Table 4: Oil Reserves (Millions of Barrels) 
Field Reserves by 
01.01.05
%
San Alberto 160.9                     19%
Sábalo 177.7                     21%
Margarita 256.6                     30%
Itau 114.7                     13%
Others 146.7                     17%
Total 856.6                     100%
Source: Authors' elaboration based on information from YPFB.  
Investments 
One of the most interesting results of the 1996-1998 reforms in the Bolivian hydrocarbon 
sector was the growth of investments. Figure 3 presents the evolution of investments during 
the period 1990-2005, showing clearly the remarkable inflow of investments during the 
second half of the 90’s. 
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However, with the application of the “Nueva Ley de Hidrocarburos” (No. 3058) in 2005, 
the investment perspectives in the sector are quite modest due to two reasons: 1) the 
application of an additional 32% tax (IDH) on the production, and b) the new structure of 
contracts established in the law. Regarding the first point, with the application of 50% of 
royalties as well as the new production tax (IDH) of 32%, there are no incentives to 
develop new small and medium sized fields and the large fields will be developed only 
under good market and price conditions. Regarding the new structure of contracts 
(operation, association and shared production), investments are discouraged due to the lack 
of clarity in commercialization aspects.    
 
Markets  
In the case of natural gas, the main share of production is dedicated to the external market, 
especially Brazil.
3  According to Table 5, in the year 2005, more than 87% of the sales of 
natural gas were dedicated to the export, while only 13% was dedicated to the internal 
market. Certainly this situation is different from the one observed in the years 1998 and 
1999, where the export to Argentina had concluded and the volumes sent to the Brazil were 
rather modest.  
 
Within the internal market, the main market is the sale to thermoelectric plants. However, 
an important growth in the sales of vehicular natural gas (VNG) is also observed.
4 
    
                                                 
3 Medinaceli (2004). 
4 Medinaceli & Zeballos (2005).   16
Table 5: Bolivian Natural Gas Markets (Millions of cubic feet/day) 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 (p)
External Market 154           101           205           371           474           544           813          1,006      
Brazil -           39             203           367           463           536           735          837         
Argentina 154           62             2               4               11             8               77            168         
Internal Market 109           105           108           90             96             112           127          171         
TOTAL 263           206           313           461           570           657           940          1,177      
Source: Authors' elaboration based on information from YPFB and the Hydrocarbons Superintendency.  
 
Natural gas exports are currently destined at Brazil and Argentina only. The GSA with 
Brazil was signed by YPFB and Petrobras, and exports started in July 1999. The agreed 
sales volumes reach a maximum of 30.08 MM cubic meters per day, but actual sales have 
been somewhat below that level. The recent export of natural gas to Argentina is carried out 
through YPFB who has signed operating contracts with Petrobras and Repsol, assigning 
them, 2.1 and 4.4 MM cubic meters per day out of the 6.5 agreed in the sales contract. But 
this is only a short term contract, which expires by the end of the year 2006.  
 
In the CGE simulations carried out in subsecuent sections of this paper, we will assume that 
oil and gas production, after having increased dramatically during the 1998-2005 period, 
will level off and even fall sligthly (see Table 6 with actual and projected production of 
natural gas and petroleum). The short term contract with Argentina this year is not 
included, and while it is possible that other export contracts will be secured in the future, 
this has become less likely after the nationalization.   
   17
Table 6: Actual and projected production of natural gas  











(Barrels per day) 
1998 7.72  37798.33 
1999 6.28  32460.00 
2000 8.85  31573.00 
2001 13.40  35795.85 
2002 16.48  36288.01 
2003 19.48  39545.00 
2004 27.10  46446.00 
2005 33.32  50756.00 
2006* 33.38  47208.30 
2007* 33.34  44565.45 
2008* 33.33  43246.77 
2009* 33.22  42189.93 
2010* 33.00  41236.65 
2011* 32.49  39439.42 
2012* 31.99  40040.39 
2013* 32.22  40173.92 
2014* 32.04  39457.19 
2015* 31.75  38308.16 
2016* 31.66  37841.35 
2017* 31.62  38222.35 
2018* 31.35  37871.22 
2019* 30.54  37406.30 
        Note: * Conservative projection. 
 
Prices   
The analysis of natural gas prices is not simple, due to the wide variety of contracts in the 
internal market and the limited access to this information (generally private). Prices vary 
from contract to contract, but the Ministry of Hydrocarbons publishes a weighted average, 
which shows the general evolution of prices. Figure 4 presents these prices expressed in 
$US per million BTU for the period 1998-2005. It can be observed that the natural gas 
export price, mainly from the GSA, have lately been higher than the corresponding price   18
for the internal market. The reason is that the sale price to Brazil (GSA) is a function of a 
basket of international fuel prices, all of which have increased dramatically during the last 
few years. 
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                     Source: Ministry of Hydrocarbons. 
 
Oil prices are notoriously difficult to predict, so for the CGE simulations carried out in the 
rest of this paper we will operate with two different scenarios. Between 1998 and 2006, we 
will in both scenarios follow the actual development of oil and gas prices, which shows a 
quadrupling of prices compared to the low levels of 1998. In the “High price” scenario we 
assume that oil and gas prices keep increasing gradually to a level about 6 times higher than 
in 1998, whereas in the “Low price” scenario we assume that prices will fall back to a level 
only 2 times higher than in 1998 (see Figure 5).    19
 
The high price in 2019 corresponds to an oil price of about $70/barrel (in 1998 dollars) and 
a natural gas price of about $4.50/MM BTU. This is not impossible to imagine, especially if 
the demand for energy keeps increasing dramatically due to rapid growth in emerging 
markets such as China and India. However, consistently high oil prices tend to encourage 
massive investments in the oil and gas sectors, as well as in alternative energy and energy 
saving technology. This mechanism would tend to push prices downward again, making the 
“Low price” scenario equally plausible. In the “Low price” scenario, oil prices level off at 
around $20/barrel, roughly corresponding to the average oil price over the last 50 years,  
and a corresponding price of $1.66/MM BTU for natural gas exports.  
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It should be noted that the current high level of royalties and taxes would make production 
unsustainable in the “Low Price” scenario, as profits would turn negative. This is not taken 
into account in the simulations, where companies are forced to operate despite losses.  
 
Taxes and Royalties 
     
Table 7 presents the results, in terms of fiscal collection, of all the royalties and taxes 
applied to the exploration and exploitation sector during the period 2000-2005.
5 Clearly the 
bulk of the contribution of the sector to the State comes in the form of royalties, however 
taxes are by no means negligible. Especially the recent 32% production tax (IDH) 
introduced by the “Nueva Ley de Hidrocarburos” in the second part of 2005 implies 
substantial additional revenues. 
 
Table 7: Royalties, taxes and bonuses (Million $US) 
Concept 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 (p)
Royalties 180.1         187.7         172.7         219.3         209.2         317.4        
Value Added Tax 19.0           25.3           7.9             8.6             2.0             6.3            
Transaction Tax 0.8             0.5             1.1             3.0             11.4           15.4          
Income Tax 7.3             22.1           6.9             10.6           23.6           63.1          
Bonuses 9.2             8.2             8.2             7.4             6.1             4.8            
Hydrocarbons Production Tax (IDH) -             -             -             -             -             288.5        
Total 216.3       243.9       196.8       248.8       252.3         695.4       
Source: Author’s elaboration based on information from YPFB, Hydrocarbons Ministry and Impuestos Internos  
 
Even more interesting numbers appears in Table 8 where the previous numbers are 
compared with the gross revenues at wellhead. As the table shows, the average government 
                                                 
5 For a detailed discussion of the tax system see Medinaceli (2003).   21
take was never only 18%, as many people believed. This is mainly due the presence of 
“Hidrocarburos Existentes” (old hydrocarbons), which paid royalties of 50%
6 and other 
taxes as well. When royalties dropped almost down to 18% in 2005, due to the shift 
towards “New hydrocarbons”, this was compensated by the introduction of the new 
production tax (IDH), which increased total government take to about 42% of gross 
production value.  
 
Table 8: Royalties and taxes as % of the gross revenues at wellhead  
Concept 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 (p)
Royalties 35% 32% 29% 27% 25% 19%
V A T ,  T r a n s a c t i o n  T a x  a n d  I n c o m e  T a x 7 %9 %4 %4 %5 %5 %
I D H 0 %0 %0 %0 %0 % 1 8 %
Total 43% 41% 34% 30% 30% 42%
Source: Author’s elaboration based on information from YPFB, Hydrocarbons Ministry and Impuestos Internos  
 
In the simulations carried out in the following sections, we assume that total government 
take follows the numbers presented in Table 7, increases to 50% in 2006, and stays at that 
level for the rest of the simulation period. 
 
4. A CGE model of the Bolivian economy 
 
The Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model used for this study is a standard 12-
sector recursively dynamic model. There is one capital category and five types of labor: 
skilled, unskilled agricultural, unskilled non-agricultural, smallholder, and urban informal. 
                                                 
6 There was, with Hydrocarbons Law 1689, a good part of the production that paid 50% as royalties.   22
Amongst the labor classes, labor is mobile only between the two unskilled classes and 
between the smallholders and the informal sector. There are six household categories 
defined by the source of their income.    
 
This model is constructed using a social accounting matrix (SAM) for Bolivia in 1997, 
developed by Thiele & Piazolo (2002). The authors of the present paper modified this SAM 
to estimate the sources and parameters for different fossil fuel taxes and royalties.   
 
For the production sectors, output, prices and factor demands are all determined 
endogenously within the model. Production is portrayed with a multiple-stage nested 
function. Labor and capital are combined in a Cobb-Douglas relationship to produce value 
added. Value added and composite intermediate goods are pooled in a constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES) function. Intermediate inputs are used in fixed proportions in the 
creation of the aggregate intermediate factor. This formulation is constructed to reflect the 
flexibility in production choices for medium to long-term processes. 
 
For the fossil fuel sector, production is fixed at the levels consistent with the contract 
negotiated with Brazil for Natural Gas exports. Internal demand depends on the level of 
activity in the economy.  
 
The model is solved recursively over a fifteen-year time horizon. The model is run for each 
time period, after which the stocks of accumulated factors are updated before the model is 
run again for the next period. The key aspect of defining the dynamic relationship in a   23
macroeconomic model is the treatment of savings and investment behavior. In this model, 
aggregate investment is determined by national savings. First, private savings are fixed as a 
fixed percentage of income for households and corporations according to their observed 
marginal propensity to save. Government savings is determined endogenously as the 
remainder after predetermined expenditures are subtracted from current revenues. In the 
absence of a solid empirical basis for estimating foreign savings levels, these are set 
exogenously at historic levels. Once this level of aggregate savings is determined, the 
allocation of investment is determined by relative profitability based upon current prices. 
This is an alternative formulation to fully dynamic models where consumers and producers 
make savings and investment decisions based upon perfect price information for all future 
periods, recognizing that decision-makers are imperfect predictors of the future. 
 
The relationship between imports and domestically produced commodities, as well as the 
relationship between exports and domestically consumed commodities, are treated in the 
standard way for CGE models, using an Armington function for imports and a constant 
elasticity of transformation (CET) function for exports. This formulation entails the 
imperfect substitution between these different commodities which allows for two-way trade 
as in observed trade relations. The sectoral definitions of the SAM distinguish between 
industrial sectors that produce goods that are used primarily for consumption, intermediate 
production and capital investments. This permits the elasticity of substitution between 
imports and domestically produced goods for these different sectors to vary, and hence for 
scenarios to look at different taxation schemes and world price trends by import type.   
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The operation of labor markets follows De Santis (2000). Using the empirical observations 
of Blanchflower & Osward (1994) and others, a relationship between real wage rates and 
unemployment is specified, where higher wages coincide with lower unemployment. The 
empirical basis of the ‘wage curve’ mimics a labor supply curve when specified in a 
simulation model. Thus the labor markets operate on the principles of supply and demand 
in the model, rather than the often used simplifications of fixed wage rates or fixed labor 
supply curves.   
 
The specification of production in the fossil fuel sector differ from the other sectors of the 
economy, in that production is not allowed to respond to changing prices. Output of 
petroleum and natural gas is predetermined in the model by the currently projected exports 
under contract with Brazil and the associated investments in the sector (see Table 6 above).
 
 
5. Structural changes due to natural gas exports 
 
There are three main benefits to the country of large natural gas exports: 1) It is an 
important source of foreign exchange which can be used to pay for imports, 2) It is an 
important source of savings, which can be used for carrying out investments, and 3) It is a 
very important source of revenue for the public sector.  
 
There are, however, also substantial indirect impacts that will result from the large infusion 
of foreign exchange into the economy. In this section, we analyze the impact of natural gas   25
exports on the Bolivian economy by comparing simulations generated by the CGE model. 
We operate with three different scenarios. The first is a base scenario corresponding to no 
gas exports to Brazil (hereafter NO GAS) where we essentially fix oil and gas production at 
the 1998 level. In the two other scenarios we increase gas exports (and associated oil 
production) according to the levels agreed in the contract with Brazil. The difference 
between the two latter scenarios is in the level of oil prices. In the “Low Price” scenario we 
assume that prices will start falling again from the currently high levels to the long term 
average of around $20 per barrel. In the “High Price” scenario we assume that prices will 
keep rising to about $70 per barrel. 
 










































































































































The apparent benefits from the increase in natural gas are substantial (See Figure 6). During 
the last five years, natural gas exports have added an average of 1.2 percentage points to   26
annual GDP growth rates. In subsequent years, the additional annual growth drops to 
around half a percentage point more than in the NO GAS scenario, depending on the level 
of oil prices. It is not necessarily better for the Bolivian economy that oil prices remain 
high. Indeed the average GDP growth rates is approximately the same in the two scenarios, 
with some years showing higher growth in the high price scenarios but other years showing 
higher growth in the low price scenario. 
 
The estimated benefits are persistent as the economy continues to grow upon a larger 
economic base. Figure 7 shows that GDP is about 11 percent higher after 16 years in either 
GAS scenario compared to NO GAS. This increase in growth is brought about not only by 
the increase in fossil fuel sales – the demand-side impact – but also by an increase in 
national savings as a result of the petroleum sales, which leads to higher investment and 
larger capital stocks – the supply-side impact. National savings and investment levels are 
estimated to be 35 percent higher in the Low Price scenario, and 43 percent higher in the 
High Price scenario, compared to the NO GAS scenario. Again, a substantial portion of this 
increase in national savings is drawn directly from the increase in natural gas revenues. An 
additional source of higher national savings is the result of cumulative growth: Higher 
investments lead to higher overall economic activity that brings on higher aggregate 
savings and investment and so on. 
   27





























































































































A substantial portion of the increase in the national savings rate is made up of government 
savings, which climbs to 45 percent of total national savings, as compared to about 15 
percent in the NO GAS scenario (see Figure 8). If oil prices fall from the current high level, 
government savings will fall again, but still remain much higher than in the NO GAS 
scenario.  
 
In the simulation model it is assumed that the government will invest all these savings in 
the production of public goods (such as roads), which improve the productivity of all 
actors. This is a very optimistic scenario with 100% efficient public investment benefitting 
everybody. Andersen & Faris (2002) explored what would happen if the government only 
invested half of the revenues in true public goods, and the rest disappeared due to 
corruption, failed investments, or increased spending on imported goods and services such   28
as ministerial cars or foreign consultants. Predictably, with less public goods, the private 
sector would be less productive, and thus receive lower incomes. We will not repeat this 
exercies in the present paper, but just highlight that the simulations presented here represent 
a very optimistic scenario, where the government is 100% efficient in the production of 
productivity encancing public goods.   
 








































































































































The increase in fossil fuel revenues accruing to the government creates an increased 
dependence on natural resources in the public sector. Fossil fuel's contribution to 
government revenues increases from about 10 percent in 1998 to about 40 percent in 2006. 
If oil prices remain high, the share of government revenues arising from fossil fuel exports 
will remain around 40 percent, whereas if prices fall the importance of fossil fuels will fall   29
to around 25 percent, which is still considerable. This stems not only from the increase in 
fossil fuel taxes destined to the government but also from a reduction in tax receipts in 
sectors that are negatively impacted by the economic changes. The increase in revenue 
presents the government with many options, including a reduction of other taxes that are 
more distortionary, an expansion of publicly financed investment projects, or direct 
transfers to the population. The present simulations represent the most optimistic scenario 
in terms of growth, as funds are used to create productivity enhancing public goods. 
However, with direct transfers to the poorest part of the population, a more equal income 
distribution could be generated. In the present paper, it is assumed that the government 
maintain the same structure of spending and investment as in the base year, just on a larger 
scale. In a subsecuent paper, we will explore whether changes in government spending and 
investment might improve on the outcomes presented here.  
 
The increase in GDP growth rates is also accompanied by a substantial change in the 
structure of the economy. In addition to the growing fossil fuel and public sectors, the 
relative composition of output changes in response to the projected changes in the real 
exchange rate that occurs with the increased flow of foreign currency into the country. The 
simulations show an appreciation of the real exchange rate that reaches a level that is 35 
percent stronger in the High Price scenario than in the NO GAS scenario. This constitutes a 
clear case of Dutch disease – imports will be cheaper and will command a larger percentage 
of domestic sales and the profitability and revenues for export sales in domestic currency 
will be lower, suppressing the non-fossil fuel export sectors.  
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If oil prices start falling again soon, the current appreciation will be reverted, and we will 
end up in 2014 with a real exchange rate that is only about 10 percent stronger than in the 
NO GAS scenario.  
 
The appreciation will have the greatest impact on the sectors of the economy that have a 
large tradeable content as a part of their product mix. The model predicts that production in 
several other sectors will be substantially lower than in the NO GAS scenario, with mining, 
intermediate goods and modern agriculture suffering the most. Apart from the fossil fuel 
industry, the sectors that benefit the most from these changes are those sectors that have 
strong linkages with the natural gas boom and ensuing investment boom – construction 
above all – and those sectors with more non-tradeable content as a part of their production 
profile such as utilities and the service sectors.   
 
Despite the higher levels of GDP and investment in the economy, there are three important 
sectors (mining, modern agriculture and intermediate goods) who suffer absolute reductions 
in their production levels in the long run as a direct consequence of the natural gas boom 
(see Figure 9). There are also other sectors which suffer initial reductions, but then recover 
due to the overall larger levels of GDP and investment in the economy. This is the case for 
consumption goods and traditional agriculture. 
   31









































































































It should be noted that these simulations are not projections. They are simply comparing 
two model scenarios, where the only difference is a large increase in natural gas exports in 
one of the scenarios, and all variables that are not directly or indirectly affected by natural 
gas exports are held constant. For example, nominal prices in all other sectors have been 
held constant, and all other exogenous shocks are ignored, as this paper wants to separate 
out the effects that are a direct consecuence of increased natural gas exports.  
 
This means that even though the model indicates a negative effect on the mining sector, this 
sector may actually experience a boom in the coming decade, but that would be due to 
other exogenous shocks such as increases in the world prices of metals, large foreign   32
investments in the sector, or new discoveries of important metal deposits in Bolivia, none 
of which are due to increased natural gas exports. Likewise, modern agriculture may do 
very well in the future, but that would be in spite of the negative effect that the natural gas 
boom has on this sector, and due to exogenous shocks purposely ignored in the present 
paper. 
 
6.  Changes in the income distribution caused by the 
natural gas boom 
 
In order to assess the distributional impact of the increase in Natural Gas sales in Bolivia, 
we observe the predicted difference in real wage rates and returns to capital that 
accompanies the resource boom. We also map the difference in income accruing to six 
household groups.   
 
Starting with wages, we see from Figure 10 that wages increase for both skilled and 
unskilled labor. Given the strong aggregate benefits of the natural gas sales presented in the 
previous section, this is not a surprise. Driven by higher investment, increasing capital 
stocks push up the marginal productivity of labor which is translated into higher wage rates. 
This rise in relative wage rates is counter-balanced by a drop in the average return to 
capital. The falling returns to capital predicted by the model are the result of the relative 
abundance of capital in the assumed absence of productivity gains. 
   33
 




































































































































Within household categories, we observe dramatic changes in real income levels. Non-
agricultural workers and employees see increases of around 15 percent in both GAS 
scenarios compared to the NO GAS. In contrast, small-holders, urban informals and 
agricultural workers see decreases of 10-20 percent in the HIGH GAS scenario compared 
to the NO GAS scenario. This is of course linked to the relative success of the sectors from 
which these households derive their incomes. Non-agricultural workers and employees are 
mainly employed in construction and government, the two sectors that benefit most from 
the gas-boom (apart from the few people occupied in the gas and oil sector).  
 
Agricultural workers suffer from the depression in modern agriculture that the sector 
experiences due to Dutch Disease. Small-holders and urban informals, the two big groups 
which include almost all of the poor in Bolivia, also see absolute reductions in their real   34
income levels, implying that the natural gas boom not only increases inequality but also 
poverty. This effect is particularly strong in the high price scenario (see Figure 11). 
 



































































































Despite the drop in average return to capital, the income accruing to capital increase as 
more capital is brought into production. Hence income to employers, who earn their income 
from capital returns, display significant increases in income. This of course implies that the 
return to existing capital is lower and that only those who have invested in the more 
profitable sectors of the new economy experience an increase in income. The owners of 
capital in agricultural and mining sectors will experience a drop in income in this context. 
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If oil prices fall again, the losses of small holders, agricultural workers and urban informals 
will be less pronounced. Indeed, they would almost return to the level of incomes that they 




The simulations made in this paper show that the natural gas boom looks very good from 
the viewpoint of the government. GDP growth rates are consistently higher than in the NO 
GAS scenario and the government has substantially more resources available for spending 
and investment, implying a smaller budget deficit, less indebtedness, more public 
investment and better paid teachers and doctors. 
 
However, from the viewpoint of the poor, the natural gas boom is not good news, especially 
not with high oil prices and high levels of royalties. Unless the government changes its 
spending and investment patterns to become substantially more pro-poor, the two large 
sectors containing most of the poor in Bolivia, small-holders and urban informals, will 
experience absolute reductions in real income levels compared to the NO GAS scenario. In 
addition, they will see an increase in inequality as the incomes of the already richer groups 
increase. 
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Modern agriculture, and other exporting sectors which might support a process of 
sustainable development in Bolivia, are also hurt by the natural gas boom, as they become 
less competitive due to the appreciation of the real exchange rate.  
 
What can the government do to counteract these obviously negative side effects of the 
natural gas boom? One possibility, which the simulations above did not allow, is to increase 
the mobility of people from the two poor sectors (rural small holders and urban informals) 
to the other sectors that fare better. Essentially, the model assumed that small-holders can 
become urban informals if they wish, but they cannot suddenly become employees or 
employers in the formal sector. Agricultural workers can become non-agricultural workers, 
but not skilled employees. Such immobility between different levels is quite realistic in the 
short run. A subsistence farmer cannot suddenly start working as a teacher or a secretary, 
and very few of the informal family businesses grow to become formal enterprises and thus 
formal employers.  
 
Achieving mobility between sectors at different levels is a long term task which requires 
long term policies and long term investments. While it is virtually impossible for a 
subsistence farmer to turn around and become a teacher or a petroleum engineer, it is not 
impossible for his sons or daughters to do so. The government, and the aid community, 
should support the movement of young people from increasingly disadvantaged rural areas 
to the urban formal sector which is prospering in the natural gas economy. This means 
better access to education, better integration of migrants from rural areas, and more formal 
sector jobs.   37
 
If the additional formal sector jobs are not all to be in the public sector, it is necessary to 
remove the obstacles that prevent informal micro-enterprises to grow into formal 
employers. The main obstacles to this are related to bureaucracy, taxes and labor laws, so 
they are not impossible to remove. Basically, a small informal family business is blessedly 
free of bureaucracy and pay little if any taxes. But if they should wish to turn into a formal 
business employing workers and paying regular salaries, they are met with a mountain of 
bureaucracy, labor laws which make it very expensive to get rid of un-necessary workers, 
and steep increases in taxes.   
 
To make the transition smoother, and thus create more formal sector jobs, it is necessary to 
make labor laws more flexible. This means less job-security for those who already have 
formal sector jobs, but better opportunities for the poor to get a job and thus escape poverty. 
 
It is also necessary to smooth the dramatic jump in taxes, which can be done either by 
raising taxes on informal businesses or reducing them for the formal businesses, or both. If 
it was made much simpler to register a formal business, the government could simply 
require all businesses to become formal, and not tolerate informal, non-contributing 
businesses. They could also create incentives, such as subsidized credit from sectoral 
development banks, which make it more attractive to become formal. 
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